# Roadmap

Tx Swap aims to be a fully decentralized protocol, but the reality is that to fully be decentralized, there's still a long road to walk through. Currently, the protocol has certain parts that are more decentralized than others, and if we were to decompartmentalize the protocol into pieces, we would have the following:

* User Interface
* Smart Contracts - Allowance & Settlement Contract
* Order DB
* Solvers Algorithms

Both the user interface and the smart contracts are pieces that are already at a 100% level of decentralization. The UI can be used by anyone without any possible blocking as it resides in IPFS. The smart contracts have no admin key and do not hold users' balances in them, making them fully trustless and decentralized. On the other hand, the order DB & the solvers are the parts of the protocol that need the most work to achieve decentralization, and that is why to do it correctly, we have decided to do it in phases rather than all at once.

### Phase 1

Initially, the smart contract curates a list of trusted solvers (e.g. an account running the solver implementation in gp-v2-services). This list would be given to the Tx DAO and will essentially control who gets to submit settlement solutions. People who want to implement solver strategies in this phase are invited to submit PRs to our repository to include their logic.

It will allow competition between different independent solver accounts that communicate via some sort of centrally managed channel. Each solver would announce the “objective value” (what that value should be optimized for, is a separate topic) they have computed for the current batch auction and all together they agree on who obtains the right to settle this auction. To compute the objective value there needs to be consensus on what the state of the auction is (all valid orders for which surplus should be achieved). This is done via a central off-chain orderbook API (more on how to decentralize this part below). We should maybe mention here that for an order to be considered valid by the Orderbook API it needs to pay a “sufficient fee” (to be discussed in a separate topic) to the protocol.

In this phase, the DAO would still pay close attention to who becomes an authenticated solver as all of them should be held accountable for any possible damage done to traders caused by a malicious solver. Furthermore, we expect the DAO to payout rewards (transaction costs + a % taken from accrued fees) to solvers based on their contribution.

### Phase 2

While the core GPv2 settlement contract is not upgradeable, the logic of how solvers are authenticated is upgradeable. In phase 2, we envision the DAO to put in place a permissionless model, where anyone can become an authenticated solver as long as they stake the asset and amount defined by the Tx DAO. For this phase, the DAO would agree on a set of rules (e.g. under what circumstances batches are allowed to be split into multiple ones, which set of on-chain liquidity has to be at least considered for a solution, etc).

Upon violation of these rules, the DAO can vote to slash a solver’s stake. The set of rules could be coded into a “verifier client” that members of the DAO run to indicate when a slashing vote should be cast.

The second, and arguably less crucial, piece of infrastructure that is centralized in the current version is the off-chain orderbook API (also part of gp-v2-services). To judge malicious behavior by a solver, participants need to agree on the state of the auction at the time of solution finding (e.g. the set of valid orders at this point).

### Phase 3

In phase 3 we hope the centrally hosted orderbook changes to a distributed p2p client network. Consensus could be reached:

* by a native client implementation,
* by making Tx Protocol a first party citizen in Ethereum nodes (e.g. OpenEthereum) or
* by piggy-backing on a cheap side chain or test network (e.g. GnosisChain) for data availability
